Yang Chengwu, whom Mao Zedong hailed as “Zhao Zilong of the military”


Called by Mao Zedong Yang Chengwu, the “Zhao Zilong of the Military”

 

Yang Chengwu was one of the first generals promoted in the People’s Republic of China; he was a Hakka native of Changting County, Fujian Province, and… Over more than seventy years of revolutionary military service, he rose from an ordinary peasant youth to become a brilliant and courageous “general who has fought in a hundred battles,” renowned for his strategic acumen and martial prowess. Mao Zedong hailed him as the “Zhao Zilong of the military”—a commander unafraid to lead the charge and ever ready to spearhead the advance. He made significant contributions to the victory of the New Democratic Revolution and to the modernization of socialism and the People’s Army.

 

Bravely forging ahead on the Long March road "Pioneer of the Road"

 

  In October 1934, following the complete failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign, the Central Base Area found itself at a critical juncture of life and death. The Central Red Army was thus compelled to undertake a strategic relocation, embarking on the momentous and grueling Long March—spanning twenty-five thousand li. During the march, Yang Chengwu served as political commissar of the Fourth Regiment, Second Division, First Corps, working successively under regimental commanders Geng Biao and Huang Kaixiang. Leading the Fourth Regiment as the vanguard of the Long March, he bore the crucial mission of clearing a path forward for the Central Red Army.

 

  Yang Chengwu led the Fourth Red Army Corps in swiftly breaking through four lines of blockade manned by heavily fortified Kuomintang forces, fighting bloody battles along the Xiangjiang River, engaging in fierce clashes on the Wujiang River, and launching a decisive assault at Lou Shan Pass, thereby providing crucial security for the Party Central Committee to convene the Zunyi Conference—a meeting of momentous historical significance. In particular, On May 27, 1935, Yang Chengwu led the Fourth Regiment of the Red Army from Anshun Field, overcoming formidable challenges—high mountains and treacherous roads, relentless combat, and extreme exhaustion—and, in a grueling forced march of 240 li in a single day and night, reached the Luding Bridge, which was heavily defended by enemy forces. He organized a commando team of 22 soldiers who, braving the enemy’s concentrated fire, scaled the exposed iron cables suspended over the river, forged through the blazing flames at the bridgehead, and seized the Luding Bridge in a daring assault. This breakthrough opened a vital crossing for the Red Army, which had been encircled and attacked on all sides, enabling the Central Red Army to safely cross the perilous Dadu River and shattering Chiang Kai-shek’s vain hope of turning the Red Army into a second Shi Dakai. Following the capture of the Luding Bridge, Yang Chengwu again led the Fourth Regiment over snow-capped mountains in search of a route, traversed grasslands to scout paths, and breached the formidable Lazikou Pass, flawlessly carrying out the vanguard mission entrusted to him by the Party Central Committee. For his outstanding contributions, he was repeatedly commended by the Military Commission of the Chinese Soviet Republic and praised by Mao Zedong, earning well-deserved recognition for his pivotal role in ensuring the Central Red Army’s triumphant completion of the Long March.

 

   Killed at Huangtuling “The Flower of Great Generals”

 

  Following the outbreak of the all-out War of Resistance in 1937, Yang Chengwu graduated ahead of schedule as a member of the first class of the “Red Army University” and rushed to the anti-Japanese front. He successively served as commander of the Independent Regiment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commander and political commissar of the Independent First Division, and commander and political commissar of the First Subregion of the Jinchaji Military Region. Leading his troops, he took part in a series of battles against the Japanese, including the Great Victory at Pingxingguan, the Hundred Regiments Offensive, the Battle of Yansuoya, and the ambush at Huangtuling, thereby delivering powerful blows to the arrogance of the Japanese aggressors and earning widespread praise from the people in the base areas. Notably, in the ambush at Huangtuling, personally commanded by Yang Chengwu, the Japanese “Mongolian Garrison Army’s” supreme commander, Lieutenant General Abe Kikujū, was killed in action—making him the first high-ranking Japanese officer to be slain on the battlefield since the beginning of Japan’s invasion of China, an event that sent shockwaves through both Japanese government and public.

 

  Huangtuling lies at the junction of Laiyuan and Yixian counties, a five-li‑long valley nestled among the northern peaks of the Taihang Mountains. Surrounded by towering, precipitous summits, its terrain is both distinctive and strategically defensible, making it an ideal battleground for the Eighth Route Army to conceal its forces and ambush Japanese troops. In mid-October 1939, the Japanese army assembled the Independent Mixed Brigade No. 2 and the main forces of the 110th Division—totaling over 20,000 troops—and launched a large-scale “sweep” operation against the Beiyue region of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Area’s anti-Japanese base, aiming to encircle and annihilate the local Eighth Route Army’s main force in one fell swoop. On November 7, Yang Chengwu, then commander and political commissar of the First Military Subregion of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, exploited the Japanese troops’ arrogance and eagerness for battle by directing local guerrilla units and small detachments to lure them into Huangtuling. He then ordered the main force to slip into ambush positions under cover of darkness, lying low and waiting for the enemy. Once the entire Japanese force had entered the ambush zone, Yang Chengwu led his troops in a sudden attack, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, who had relaxed their vigilance and found no place to take cover, pinning them down in a narrow ravine some two or three li long and barely a hundred meters wide. During the fierce fighting, the Eighth Route Army’s attacking units spotted a group of Japanese officers in yellow woolen coats coming and going near an isolated house; they promptly identified this as the Japanese command post and immediately called in the subregion’s artillery battery to deliver a barrage, killing the Japanese commander, Lieutenant General Abe Norimichi, on the spot. Abe Norimichi was a renowned “mountain warfare expert” in the Japanese military, widely hailed as the “flower of distinguished generals.” Following his death at the hands of the Eighth Route Army, Japan ran a three-day front-page headline titled “The Flower of Distinguished Generals Has Wilted on the Taihang Mountains.” When his ashes were returned to Tokyo, not only did all senior commanders and numerous dignitaries attend the station to pay their respects, but the city also lowered its flags to half‑mast in mourning.

 

   Zhangjiakou launched the Pingjin Campaign.

 

  In November 1948, with the victorious conclusion of the Liaoshen Campaign and the ongoing Huaihai Campaign, Fu Zuoyi’s Nationalist forces in the Peiping–Tianjin region found themselves encircled, isolated, and without reinforcements, their defeat already sealed. To prevent the Nationalist North China army from retreating westward to Suiyuan or withdrawing by sea to the south—actions that would have jeopardized the subsequent Yangtze River Crossing Campaign—the Central Military Commission explicitly adopted the operational guideline of “detaining and annihilating Fu Zuoyi’s group in the North China region” and formulated the campaign principle of “strike at both ends first, then seize the center.” Specifically, on the western front, it ordered the capture of Xinbao’an and Zhangjiakou; on the eastern front, it directed the liberation of Tianjin, thereby cutting off the Nationalist forces’ routes for westward retreat and southward escape and striving to destroy them in place within North China.

 

  To implement the aforementioned operational guidelines, the Central Military Commission ordered the Third Corps of the North China Military Region to first encircle Zhangjiakou, severing the Fu Zuoyi group’s route westward into Suiyuan, and luring Fu Zuoyi to dispatch troops in a western relief effort, thereby enabling our forces to firmly seize strategic initiative on the Pingjin battlefield. On November 25, 1948, Yang Chengwu led the First, Second, and Sixth Columns of the Third Corps eastward from the Jining area, launching an attack on the Kuomintang forces surrounding Zhangjiakou on the 29th and firing the first shot of the Pingjin Campaign. By December 2, the Third Corps had established a complete encirclement of Zhangjiakou. On December 24, the Third Corps launched a general offensive, annihilating the entire Kuomintang Eleventh Corps, which had been squeezed into a mountain ravine roughly 10 kilometers long and 0.5 kilometers wide outside the Dajing Gate—around Xidianzi, Chaotianwa, Wulahada, and Huangtuyao. In this campaign, under Yang Chengwu’s command, the Third Corps destroyed over 65,000 Kuomintang troops and captured 13 officers at the general‑officer level, setting a record at the time for the largest single‑engagement casualty count in North China.

 

   Wendeng Chuanli Pò “Tank Breakthrough”

 

  Following the outbreak of the Korean War, Yang Chengwu was ordered to enter North Korea and assumed command of the 20th Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. In September 1951, leveraging its superior equipment and logistical capabilities, the U.S. forces launched a “Fall Offensive” along both the eastern and western fronts of the Korean Peninsula. In October, on the eastern front, they concentrated six divisions to strike along the Kimcheng–Mundungchon line. At that time, the 20th Corps under Yang Chengwu had just completed a rotation with the Korean People’s Army; unfamiliar with the terrain, enemy dispositions, and the overall battlefield situation, it was forced to respond hastily to the U.S. forces’ fierce assault. To exploit their technological and firepower advantages, the U.S. military employed the so‑called “tank‑piercing” tactic when attacking the Volunteer Army’s defensive positions: deploying formations of 20 to 40 tanks at a time, supported by heavy air cover and accompanied by infantry and engineers, they simultaneously unleashed dense artillery and tank fire against fortified positions while maneuvering along mountain roads to fragment the Volunteer Army’s forward defenses, followed by infantry advancing to seize each hill one by one. On one occasion, a company (or platoon) of our 67th Army held a defensive position that, in addition to enduring repeated bombing and strafing by various aircraft, endured 10,000 to 30,000 artillery shells daily, all while fending off repeated assaults by coordinated tank–infantry teams—resisting the U.S. forces’ armored thrusts with sheer human resolve. Under the relentless pressure of the U.S. offensive, Commander Yang Chengwu directed his troops to adopt a strategy of fighting while replenishing, rapidly repairing fortifications, and retaking during the night any ground lost by day, engaging in desperate, life‑and‑death contests with the enemy and refusing to yield a single inch of territory. After three days of brutal fighting, the 67th Army staunchly withstood the U.S. forces’ frenzied onslaught, thwarting their “tank‑piercing” maneuver, demonstrating the Volunteer Army’s indomitable spirit and courage, and turning our defensive positions along the Mundungchon line into an impregnable steel barrier that proved insurmountable for the U.S. forces.

 

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