Solution: The first Chief of Staff of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army
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2021-03-25 09:07
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Solution: The first Chief of Staff of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army
Jie Fang, born Jie Ruchuan and courtesy name Peiran, was among the first batch of major generals conferred in the People’s Republic of China. During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, he served as the first chief of staff of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, directed numerous major campaigns, and took part in the Korean Armistice Talks, earning distinguished merit for the victory of the war.
“Then let’s just change your name to ‘Jie Fang.’”
In his early years, Xie Fang joined the Northeast Army. In 1936, he formally became a member of the Chinese Communist Party and began working within the Northeast Army on behalf of the Party. On the very day of the Xi’an Incident, which shocked both China and the world, Xie Fang, together with patriotic generals such as Liu Zhonggan of the Northeast Army, launched the Lanzhou Incident in Lanzhou—more than a thousand li away from Xi’an—in response to the events unfolding there. He commanded troops to encircle the Pacification Headquarters and various secret organizations, thereby stabilizing the situation in Lanzhou, bolstering the momentum of the Xi’an Incident, and helping to bring about its peaceful resolution.
Subsequently, Xie Fang was dispatched to Guangxi to coordinate anti-Japanese efforts. In early 1937, he returned to Xi’an and reported to Zhou Enlai on the situation in Guangxi. Zhou Enlai commended his endeavors to advance the united front against Japan and instructed him to unite the people of Northeast China, the Northeast Army, and the Northeast’s patriotic organizations, thereby broadening the anti-Japanese national united front, striving for democracy, and ensuring victory in the War of Resistance.
Following the outbreak of the all-out War of Resistance, Xie Fang was dispatched to the Fifth War Zone to clandestinely carry out Party work and mass mobilization. After the Battle of Xuzhou, he accompanied his unit to southern Shandong, where he vigorously advanced Party activities within the Northeast Army. In the summer of 1940, the Party’s work committee in the Northeast Army’s 51st Corps was disrupted, forcing Xie Fang to withdraw from Shandong and make his way to Yan’an.
In June 1941, Xie Fang arrived in Yan’an, where he and others were warmly received by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. With a touch of humor, Mao Zedong said to Xie Fang, “Comrade ‘Jie Fang,’ you’ve already come home. From now on, let’s change your name to ‘Xie Fang’—no more ‘liberation’!” From that day forward, “Xie Fang” became his official name.
Jie Fang is a competent chief of staff.
In June 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War, the Central Military Commission decided to establish the Northeast Border Defense Force and dispatched the 13th Corps of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to the Yalu River front, appointing Xie Fang as its chief of staff. In August 1950, upon arriving at the front, Xie Fang immediately went to the corps’ operations room to hear reports from the operations officers on the enemy‑and‑friendly situation and to propose solutions to unresolved issues. Within a mere month, he swiftly familiarized himself with the basic conditions of his subordinate units, conducted a detailed survey of the terrain and landforms along the Yalu River, and analyzed the battlefield’s enemy‑and‑friendly dispositions. He also made a well‑grounded assessment that future operations would be characterized by modern warfare and mountain combat—insights that were subsequently borne out in practice.
On August 31, 1950, Xie Fang drafted a report—signed by Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi, and Xie Fang—on the operational preparedness of the border defense forces. The report received high regard and strong endorsement from the Central Military Commission as well as from Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and others. In October, the Northeast Border Defense Force was renamed the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, and Xie Fang was appointed Chief of Staff of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army.
As the Chief of Staff of the Volunteer Army, Xie Fang often worked day and night, conducting operational studies with the relevant departments of the Volunteer Army Headquarters and offering insightful recommendations on how to effectively implement the army’s operational intentions. When planning campaigns and adjusting deployments, Commander Peng Dehuai would frequently remark, “Bring in Zhuge Liang to brief us on the situation.” The “Zhuge Liang” Peng Dehuai referred to was none other than Xie Fang. Since the beginning of the war in Korea, Xie Fang remained at Peng Dehuai’s side, earning his trust and high regard through his extraordinary memory, quick-wittedness, profound strategic acumen, and outstanding performance. Cadres at the Volunteer Army Headquarters once recalled that Peng Dehuai was extremely strict and prone to reprimanding others, yet he never once criticized Xie Fang. On one occasion, a comrade remarked that Xie Fang came from an “old‑style military background,” whereupon Peng Dehuai flew into a rage and sternly retorted: “So what if he comes from an old‑style military background? In my view, Xie Fang is an excellent comrade and a capable Chief of Staff!”
During the Fifth Campaign, Peng Dehuai specially dispatched Xie Fang back to China to report to Mao Zedong on the situation on the Korean battlefield. On May 27, 1951, Mao Zedong summoned Xie Fang to hear his briefing on the Korean front. In that meeting, Mao Zedong vividly likened concentrating superior forces to deliver small, decisive blows to “chopping off bits of taffy.” From then on, the phrase “chopping off bits of taffy” became a specialized term used by the Volunteer Army to describe its practice of conducting small‑scale annihilating engagements in defensive operations, and it came to embody the correct strategic guideline that guided the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army to victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.
At the negotiating table, not a single issue can be compromised.
On July 3, 1951, Mao Zedong convened a meeting on the convening of peace talks and specifically instructed Peng Dehuai: “Order Xie Fang and the unit commanders to expedite arrangements for the conference venue in Kaesong and related matters, ensuring the safety of liaison officers and representatives from both sides.” In accordance with Mao’s directive, Peng Dehuai recommended that Xie Fang, as one of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s representatives, promptly join the preparations for the conference, making thorough prior arrangements for the selection, layout, and security of the negotiation venue. On July 8, Xie Fang attended a liaison officers’ meeting held in the outskirts of Kaesong to prepare for the Korean Armistice Conference. On July 10, the Korean Armistice Talks officially commenced in Kaesong. From the very outset, protracted disputes erupted. The U.S. side not only adopted a deliberately delaying stance and engaged in unjustified surprise attacks during the negotiations but also brazenly launched summer and autumn offensives, leading to interruptions in the talks.
In October 1951, the Korean Armistice Talks resumed. By late November, negotiations once again reached an impasse over the armistice‑guarantee agreement, with a major point of contention being the issue of troop rotations and the replenishment of weaponry. The U.S. side sought the right to rotate its forces; our side accepted this proposal but insisted that the number of troops rotated be limited to 5,000 per month. However, the U.S. deemed this figure insufficient, demanding the right to replace old weapons with new ones, to exchange fully loaded ammunition boxes for empty ones, and to impose restrictions on military facilities in northern Korea. Our side regarded these demands as unwarranted interference in Korea’s internal affairs, firmly informing the U.S. side that such proposals were absolutely unacceptable, and reiterating our unshakable, resolute position: “We firmly maintain that, during the armistice period, our right to manage certain equipment within Korean territory must remain entirely beyond your purview. Nor will we permit any reconnaissance activities in our airspace.”
In January 1952, the third‑item agenda subcommittee of the Korean Armistice Talks convened once again. Li Fang systematically exposed the hypocrisy and emptiness of the U.S. side’s various arguments and refuted its unreasonable demand to “restrict the repair and construction of airfields.” After protracted debate, and with the U.S. forces on the battlefield clearly recognizing that victory was no longer attainable, the U.S. side was compelled to accept our fair and reasonable proposals, and an agreement was ultimately reached on the issue of armistice guarantees.
During the Korean Armistice Talks, Xie Fang consistently upheld the principles of fairness and reasonableness, patiently advancing the negotiations and engaging in principled, evidence-based exchanges with the U.S. side, thereby helping to secure a successful outcome. On July 27, 1953, the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom. In his later years, reflecting on this chapter of history, Xie Fang remarked: “At the negotiating table, we could not afford to yield even the slightest point; it was a struggle—losing a single round was simply unacceptable.”
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