The Zunyi Conference: A Momentous Turning Point of Life-and-Death Importance
Release date:
2021-03-24 09:09
Source:
The Zunyi Conference: A Momentous Turning Point of Life-and-Death Importance
Eighty-five years ago, the Communist Party of China convened an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in Zunyi, a major city in northern Guizhou—known as the Zunyi Conference. This marked the beginning of the Party’s independent and self-reliant approach to addressing critical issues such as the Chinese revolution and military strategy, and it established a new central leadership collective. At a moment of extreme peril, the Zunyi Conference saved the Party, the Red Army, and the Chinese revolution, becoming a pivotal turning point of decisive significance in the history of the Party.
It resolved the most pressing military issue of the time, saved the Party, saved the Red Army, and saved the Chinese revolution.
From From the establishment of the Provisional Central Committee, headed by Bogu, in September 1931 to… January 1935 The Zunyi Conference was a pivotal event in the history of the Communist Party of China. During the period of the “Left” deviationist line, its most disastrous consequence was the marginalization of Mao Zedong’s leadership within the Party and the Red Army. As a result, the revolutionary situation that had previously been advancing victoriously was comprehensively undermined, and the revolutionary cause suffered grave losses. Beginning with the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign, the Comintern military adviser Otto Braun—known as Li De—blindly copied the Soviet Red Army’s conventional warfare tactics, discarding all the experience gained in the earlier anti‑encirclement campaigns in the soviet areas. This ultimately led to the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign in the Central Soviet Area and forced the main force of the Central Red Army to abandon the central base area and embark on the Long March.
At a critical juncture in history, the Zunyi Conference addressed the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign… Summing up the lessons learned from the military campaigns since the “encirclement and suppression” campaigns, the meeting concluded: “All evidence demonstrates that our purely defensive military line was the principal reason we were unable to defeat the enemy’s five ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaigns. Any attempt to use the Party’s correct line to justify errors in military leadership is futile.” The meeting further held: “At the present stage of the Chinese civil war, with no major urban worker uprisings or mutinies among White Army soldiers to support us, with our Red Army still severely outnumbered, with our soviet areas comprising only a small part of China, and with our lack of specialized weapons such as aircraft and artillery, and while we remain engaged in operations on the interior front, when the enemy launches an offensive against us and initiates ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaigns, our strategic line must naturally be one of decisive‑battle defense—meaning that our defense is not mere passive defense, but rather a defense aimed at seeking a decisive battle, with a view to transitioning to a counteroffensive and an offensive.”
The Zunyi Conference affirmed and established the strategic and tactical principles of Mao Zedong’s military line of decisive defense. Liu Bocheng recalled: “After the Zunyi Conference, our army reversed its previous pattern, as if suddenly infused with new life. We maneuvered in circuitous, intricate ways, threading between the enemy forces—appearing to head east only to turn west, seeming to cross the Yangtze and move north only to strike back from afar. At every turn we took the initiative, brimming with vigor and vitality, keeping the enemy on the defensive.” “In stark contrast to the period of the ‘Left’ deviationist line, these developments led all officers and soldiers to a deeper understanding: Mao Zedong’s correct line and the highly developed Marxist art of war are the sole guarantee that ensures our army remains invincible.”
It set the course of the Chinese revolution aright and marked the beginning of the Communist Party of China’s steadfast adherence to the path of independence and self-reliance.
Following the Zunyi Conference, the Communist Party of China began to integrate Marxism with China’s concrete realities and to independently formulate its own lines, principles, and policies. “The transformation of the Party following the Zunyi Conference stemmed from the gradual accumulation of experience and the heightened awareness among its senior cadres, who emerged from defeat. This marked the end of dogmatic errors and a recognition of the grave consequences wrought by empiricist mistakes, while also fostering a style of work characterized by close ties with the masses and a commitment to seeking truth from facts.”
The Communist Party of China began to independently and autonomously correct… The errors of the “left”‑leaning military line. At the time, owing to the inability of the radio station to establish contact with the Comintern, the CPC Central Committee, without seeking instructions from or obtaining approval from the Comintern, independently and on its own initiative at the Zunyi Conference abolished the “Troika,” criticized and rejected the supreme command authority over the Red Army exercised by the Comintern’s military adviser, Otto Braun (Li De), and concluded: “In particular, Comrade Hua Fu (Li De) adopts an extremely harmful style of leadership. All matters of the Military Commission are handled exclusively by Comrade Hua Fu, completely abolishing the collective leadership of the Commission; punitive measures have reached an extreme degree, while self‑criticism is entirely absent. With regard to all dissenting views on military affairs, not only are they wholly ignored, but various repressive methods are employed, thereby stifling the initiative and creativity of lower‑rank commanders.”
Independence and self-reliance have become fundamental principles guiding the founding of the Communist Party of China and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Mao Zedong pointed out: “Having teachers has its advantages, but also its drawbacks. We should do without teachers—read on our own, write on our own, and think for ourselves. This, too, is a fundamental truth. In the past, we relied on teachers to hold our hands as we wrote. From the founding of the Party in 1921 until 1935, we suffered greatly because of this reliance on teachers. The program was drafted by teachers, and the resolutions of the Central Committee plenary sessions were also penned by them—especially those of 1931—which inflicted heavy losses upon us. After that, we learned to think for ourselves. It took us decades to truly come to know China. How could it be acceptable that Chinese people did not understand the realities of China? It was only with the Zunyi Conference that we truly grasped the importance of independence and self-reliance. At that meeting, dogmatism was condemned; the dogmatists maintained that everything in the Soviet Union was correct and refused to adapt it to China’s concrete conditions.”
It altered the course of Chinese politics and marked the beginning of the Communist Party of China’s efforts to build a mature central leadership collective.
At the Zunyi Conference, Mao Zedong was elected a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, thereby entering the Party’s highest decision-making echelon. This shift in Mao’s political standing created both the possibility and the practical conditions for him to address the question of the Chinese revolutionary path from a strategic and holistic perspective. Yang Shangkun, who attended the Zunyi Conference, recalled: “After enduring numerous setbacks and failures, the Chinese Communists, through the pivotal historical turning point of the Zunyi Conference, gradually forged a correct leadership collective with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core. Comrade Mao Zedong’s rise from a leader of a major rural revolutionary base area to the paramount leader of the entire Party and the entire army was a process fraught with struggle and marked by arduous twists and turns. On the one hand, this was due to the fact that Mao Zedong’s sound strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside progressively took root throughout the Party; his outstanding military command, demonstrated in the defeat of the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” campaigns, won the unanimous approval of the entire armed forces. On the other hand, it was also because Party leaders like Comrade Zhou Enlai, confronted with the bitter lessons of bloodshed, placed the interests of the Party above all else, displayed broad-mindedness, upheld the truth, and resolutely supported and trusted Comrade Mao Zedong’s correct leadership.”
Prior to the Zunyi Conference, the Communist Party of China was still in its infancy, overly reliant on the Comintern and lacking a deep understanding of China’s national conditions and the laws governing the Chinese revolution, thus failing to establish a strong and mature central leadership collective. Deng Xiaoping pointed out: “Before the Zunyi Conference, our Party had never established a mature central leadership. From Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, Xiang Zhongfa, and Li Lisan to Wang Ming, none of them managed to forge a capable central leadership. Our Party’s leading collective began to take shape gradually with the Zunyi Conference—namely, Comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai. After Comrade Ren Bishi passed away, Comrade Chen Yun was added to the group.” Following the Zunyi Conference, although Mao Zedong did not hold the highest leadership position at the time, he occupied a pivotal role in the Party’s and the Red Army’s most critical military operations. This was because Mao had long been on the front lines of military struggle, and his outstanding abilities earned him the deep respect and widespread admiration of Red Army officers and soldiers. At the same time, leaders such as Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De highly valued Mao’s views and recommendations, so in practice, Mao occupied a central leadership position in the Party’s and the Red Army’s decision-making.
As Hu Sheng put it: “Subsequent history has shown that the Zunyi Conference was not merely a shift in military strategy and leadership; it also marked a transformation of the political line, ushering in a new phase. Seen in the light of the victories in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the Liberation War, the significance of the Zunyi Conference is immense. Without it, it would be hard to imagine that the Party and the armed forces could have achieved such remarkable growth during the War of Resistance, nor that they could have secured victory in the Liberation War so swiftly. Just fourteen years after the Zunyi Conference, the Chinese revolution triumphed—something that could not have been foreseen at the time. Looking back today, it is clear that the Zunyi Conference laid the firm foundation for the ultimate victory of the Chinese revolution.”
Previous page
Latest News
Post a comment